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Abstract
We study how complementarities and intellectual property rights aﬀect the man-
agement of knowledge workers. The main results relay when a firm will wish to
sue workers that leave with innovative ideas, and the eﬀects of complementary as-
sets on wages and on worker initiative. We argue that firms strongly protected
by property rights may not sue leaving workers in order to motivate eﬀort, while
firms weakly protected by complementary assets must sue in order to obtain pos-
itive profits. Firms with more complementary assets pay higher wages (and have
lower turnover), but such higher pay has a detrimental eﬀect on worker initiative.
Our analysis suggests that strengthened property rights protection reduces turnover
costs but weakens worker initiative.
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To make knowledge-work productive will be the great management task of this
century, just as to make manual work productive was the great management
task of the last century (Peter Drucker, 1969, p.290).
1 Introduction
Knowledge workers make up a significant fraction of the workforce in advanced economies
(some estimates loom as high as 25-30%). Their expertise determines the success of count-
less organizations around the world, but still we have limited insight on the management
of such workers.1 The paper aims to fill this void in a context where worker initiative
stems from the possibility of leaving its employer carrying valuable ideas, and firms are
imperfectly protected by complementary assets and property rights. Our analysis ad-
dresses two questions. When will a firm take legal action and sue its leaving workers?
How does complementary assets and property rights influence a firm’s wage policy and
worker initiative?
The crux of the paper is twofold. We argue that a firm weakly protected by comple-
mentary assets should sue its leaving workers, while a firm strongly protected by property
rights may not. A firm weakly protected by complementary assets must sue in order to
avoid having only unproductive workers stay on in the firm. A strongly protected firm
may not sue because suing would eliminate worker initiative. Second, we argue that firms
with more complementary assets should pay higher wages, and will as a result experience
less worker initiative. The intuition is that a firm with more complementary assets have
a higher marginal value from workers staying on, and will therefore pay higher wages
in order to keep more workers. However, such higher pay will serve as a cushion that
weakens worker initiative.
In the model, firms are exposed to both moral hazard in that workers exert unob-
servable eﬀort to generate ideas, and adverse selection in that workers observe their ideas
privately. After a worker has generated an idea, the firm oﬀers a continuation wage which
the worker may accept and stay on in the firm, or reject and start up his own business.
1For example, see the January 2006 survey of the Economist, Roberts (2004), or Neef (1999) for
evidence on the importance of knowledge workers.
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If the worker leaves, the firm may sue the worker. Complementarities play a role in de-
termining the value of the idea to the firm and property rights play a role in determining
how likely it is that the firm wins a litigation case against the worker.
The worker’s motivation to exert eﬀort stems from being able to capture a fraction of
the value of the idea if leaving. The worker has stronger incentives to exert eﬀort if he
expects the firm not to sue, since his fraction then becomes larger. The firm’s litigation
policy therefore balances the benefits from more motivated workers with the costs from
more workers leaving. At a casual level, this trade-oﬀ accords with the personnel policy
at Hewlett Packard, which in addition to encouraging workers to start up their own
companies had a reputation for the employees being highly motivated.
We find that a firm strongly protected by complementary assets and by strong property
rights may not sue leaving workers. The reason is that suing would then be a ”too
powerful” instrument and ruin worker initiative. Conversely, we find that a firm not
protected by complementary assets must sue in order to get positive profits. The intuition
is that if the firm does not have complementary assets, not suing will lead to adverse
selection where only workers not worth the wage they are paid will stay on in the firm.
Our analysis suggests that firms more strongly protected by complementarities pay
higher wages, has less turnover and has less motivated workers. Stronger complementar-
ities imply that a given idea has a higher value inside the firm, and the firm decreases
turnover by paying more. Lower turnover implies less motivated workers, because the
entrepreneurial option becomes less attractive relative to staying on in the firm. If we as-
sume that larger firms have stronger complementaries, these findings are consistent with
evidence from labor economics that larger firms pay higher wages (see e.g., Fox, 2004,
for an overview) and have lower turnover (Even & MacPherson, 1996, Kim & Marschke,
2005).
Finally, our analysis suggests that weakened property rights protection increases worker
initiative but may waste synergies. We note that the existing literature (e.g., Schotchmer,
2004) argues that intellectual property rights should be strong when ex-ante eﬀects (on
firms’ R&D investments) are important relative to ex-post eﬀects (on the use of innova-
tions). In contrast, we suggest that intellectual property rights should be weak when the
ex-ante eﬀects (on worker initiative) are relatively important and strong when the ex-post
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eﬀects (on the use of complementary assets) are important.
The paper is structured as follows. The next subsection discusses related literature.
Sections 2 contains the model setup, Section 3 the analysis, and Section 4 concludes. The
appendix contains proofs.
1.1 Related literature
The empirical motivation for the paper comes from several sources. Bhide (2000) finds
that 71% of entrepreneurs in his sample replicated or modified an idea encountered
through previous employment, which echoes earlier research by Cooper (1984).2 Marschke
& Kim (2005) finds that firms located in industries with higher worker turnover rates
patent more, which suggests that patenting may partly be a protective measure against
employees. Stone (2002) reports that the number of court cases involving covenants not to
compete and trade secrets has increased sharply over the last decades. Similar findings are
reported by Lowry (1988). Taken together, this evidence suggests that knowledge workers
pose a threat in addition to being a crucial input.3 Hewlett-Packard institutionalized a
famous policy where workers were encouraged to leave and start up their own companies,
often with ideas based in their employment at Hewlett-Packard.4 On the other hand,
in a much-publicized case where workers from the electronics company Cadence founded
a company based on software programs and customer relations developed at Cadence,
Cadence sued the workers and several of the previous employees received fines and prison
sentences (Glynn & Mukherjee, 2003).5 This anecdotal evidence suggests considerable
heterogeneity on the suing policy of R&D intensive firms.
We are not aware of closely related theoretical papers. There are three branches of
the literature that address related issues: the management of innovation, the economics
2Cooper (1985) finds that 70% of founders of new firms in a broad cross-section of industries where
previously employed in the same industry.
3There is a long range of anecdotal evidence that gives the same picture. A fascinating historical
account is given by Fisk (2001).
4The response of Dave Packard, one of the two founders of Hewlett-Packard, was, ”Are we upset that
they left us? On the contrary, Bill and I understand and respect their entrepreneurial spirit.” (Packard,
1995)
5Among more well-known companies, Intel and Microsoft have a reputation for being uncooperative
with leavers, and the same goes for a range of Route 128 companies as described by Saxenian (1994).
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of litigation, and industrial economics of R&D.
Pakes & Nitzan (1983) considered a moral hazard problem where firms have no formal
property rights protection and workers can appropriate part of their output. Such appro-
priation provides workers with an incentive to provide eﬀort. While our model shares this
feature of Pakes-Nitzan, their paper does not consider workers having private informa-
tion about output, which drives turnover in our model, nor the possibility of firms suing
leaving workers.6 In Aghion & Tirole (1994), the problem is how to allocate ownership
to alleviate hold-up problems between a research unit and a customer. Their assump-
tion that ownership rights over an invention are contractible ex-ante eliminate most of
the issues we are concerned about, in particular turnover. Anton & Yao (1994, 2002)
asks how a privately informed inventor might sell an idea when property rights are weak.
Anton & Yao (1994) argues that the threat of selling oﬀ the idea to a competitor may
give the inventor some rents from bargaining with an incumbent firm, and Anton & Yao
(2002) argues that a partial disclosure of the idea may be beneficial.7 We use the insight
from Anton-Yao that an innovator may be reluctant to reveal the content of an idea to
motivate our assumption that workers have private information about their innovations,
but do not explore mechanisms in which the worker can transmit his private information.
This question is briefly discussed in Section 3.5.
The incentives to litigate has been studied by several authors, e.g., Bebchuk (1984)
and Reinganum & Wilde (1986) on pretrial negotiations, and Priest & Klein (1984) on
the probability of succeeding in court. See the survey by Cooter & Rubinfeld (1989) on
the economics of legal disputes. On empirical evidence, Siegelman & Waldfogel (1996)
and Lanjouw & Lerner (1998) estimate a Priest-Klein model on data from litigation cases,
and finds that intellectual property rights cases are relatively predictable but also quite
6The same holds for Kim & Marschke (2005). Hvide (2005) considers a Pakes-Nitzan type of model,
but where workers have private information about the value of their output. Hvide (2005) does not
consider workers’ eﬀort decision, nor firms’ suing decision.
Møen (2005) considers labor mobility in a sample of firms with varying R&D intensity. Møen finds,
consistent with the Pakes-Nitzan view that wage setting in R&D intensive firms is geared to retain workers,
that the steepness of wage profile is positively related to a firm’s R&D intensity. Oyer & Schaefer (2005)
finds evidence that option-based compensation is geared to retain workers rather than to elicit eﬀort.
7A related literature considers how to protect innovations from product-market competitors (e.g.,
Anton & Yao, 2004). The underlying tension is that patents may give stronger formal rights but also
disclose more about the innovation.
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hard to win (about 35% are ruled in favor of the plaintiﬀ in the former sample).
According to Mansfield (1986) in many industries firms regard complementary assets,
rather than property rights, as their main tool for protecting their innovations. The
present paper is to our knowledge the first on how complementary assets aﬀect the man-
agement of knowledge workers. Most of the industrial economics literature on R&D has
considered the firm as a unit and examined how product market competition and patent
policy jointly determine R&D investments (Scotchmer, 2004, gives an overview). While
this literature provide insight into how a firm’s competitive environment stimulates in-
vestments in R&D, it has been unable to analyze how successful innovation depends on
worker initiative.
2 The model
There is one principal (owner) and one agent (worker). The agent has reservation utility
U¯ , which we normalize to zero. At date 1, the agent is hired and paid a non-negative
fixed wage F . The worker then exerts eﬀort e ≥ 0 at private cost c(e), where c(e) is
increasing and convex with c(0) = c0(0) = 0. At date 2, an idea with stand-alone value
x is realized, where x = e + ² and ² is a random white noise with infinite support and
distribution function G(.).8 The agent learns x, whereas the firm does not. At date 3, the
firm then oﬀers a non-negative continuation wage B based on its conjecture about x. The
agent accepts or rejects B. Accepting B means signing an extension of the employment
contract, and the final payoﬀs are θx−B to the firm and B to the agent, where θ ≥ 1. θ
reflects economies of scope from developing the idea inside the firm due to complementary
assets such as equipment, sales channels, or co-workers. We will interchangeably denote θ
by ”economies of scope” and complementarities. A situation with weak complementarities
corresponds to θ close to 1 and a situation with strong complementarities corresponds to
θ >> 1. Initially we treat θ as given and briefly discuss investments in θ in Section 3.5.
If the agent rejects the continuation wage oﬀer B, he quits the firm and develops a
start-up based on x. The worker’s payoﬀ from leaving with the idea depends on whether
8This means that bad ideas can have negative value. This feature of the model plays an insignificant
role in the results.
6
the firm sues the worker at date 3 or not. If the firm does not sue, the final payoﬀs become 0
to the firm and x to the worker. If the firm sues, the payoﬀs depend on the court outcome.
If the court rules in favor of the firm, the firm gets θx − v, i.e., the idea is returned to
the firm, where v ≥ 0 is the firm’s cost of litigation. The worker gets zero. If the court
rules in favor of the worker, the worker keeps the idea and develops it in the start-up.
The firm gets −v and the worker x. We assume that the firm has the formal ownership
rights to the innovation but that enforcement by courts is probabilistic. Specifically, we
assume that the firm wins the litigation trial with probability φ ∈ [0, 1]. A low (high) φ
corresponds to a situation where the court enforcement is weak (strong). We think of φ
as partly being determined by industry characteristics such as diﬃculty in verifying the
value of early-stage innovations, and partly by legislation such as the feasibility of patent
protection or the enforcement of trade secret or non-compete clauses.9
We assume that the firm chooses a (deterministic) litigation policy at date 0. One
way to justify commitment is that it is observable to outsiders whether the worker leaves
or not, so that the firm can have a reputation for being tough or lenient with leavers, or
even write a formal contract upon it.10 Where necessary, we assume that G(.) is such
that the profit function is globally concave in B.
An overview of the timing appears in Figure 1.
9As evidenced by a large legal literature (see e.g., Kim & Marschke, 2005, page 299, for references)
firms and employees cannot easily contract around the problem of workers leaving with innovations. One
reason is that excessively broad non-compete contracts will be voided by courts.
The idea that court outcomes are probabilistic has considerable empirical support, see e.g., Lemley &
Shapiro (2005) and Stone (2002). Stone (2002) discusses various aspects of the law of post-employment
restraints and argues that the courts’ enforcement of such restraints varies from state to state and even
from case to case. For example, courts diﬀer in their interpretation of whether negative knowledge
qualifies as a trade secret (Stone, 2002, p. 756).
10Another way to think of commitment to not sue is to interpret it as granting formal ownership rights
up-front to the agent over the innovation.
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A worker is hired 
and chooses a 
non-observable 
effort level. 
The worker 
generates an 
idea and 
learns its 
value. 
If the firm 
litigates, the 
court makes a 
decision.  
Date 0 Date 1 Date 2 Date 4 
The firm chooses 
a litigation 
policy. 
The firm 
makes a wage 
offer and the 
worker accepts 
or rejects. 
 
Date 3 
Figure 1: Timing
The basic trade-oﬀs are as follows. The worker chooses an eﬀort level trading oﬀ its private
cost against a higher value of the idea if he becomes an entrepreneur. The firm sets a
wage that trades oﬀ the gains from keeping better worker types (ideas) with the cost of
paying more for all staying worker types. We focus on Perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE).
A combination of strategies is a PBE if a)the principal sets a wage and its suing policy
optimally given its beliefs about eﬀort, b) the worker anticipates the firm’s behavior and
chooses eﬀort to maximize his utility. This equilibrium notion ensures that the firm’s
conjecture about eﬀort and the worker’s conjecture about the wage setting are fulfilled
on the equilibrium path.
Two important assumptions underlying this model setup is that (i)the firm (unin-
formed party) makes the wage oﬀer and (ii) that the firm sets a sequentially rational
wage rather than commit to a wage policy up front. Changing these assumptions are
unlikely to alter the main insights, as discussed in Section 3.5.
3 Analysis
We solve the game by in backwards sequence examining the worker’s leaving decision,
the firm’s wage oﬀer, the worker’s eﬀort decision, and the firm’s suing policy. Then we
analyze the eﬀects of changing the level of complementary assets (θ) and strength of
property rights protection (φ).
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3.1 Eﬀort and wages
First we examine eﬀort and wage setting in the subgame if the firm litigates. Then we
examine the same variables in the subgame where the firm does not litigate.
When deciding whether to leave or not, the worker compares what he gets from staying,
B, with the expected payoﬀ from leaving and starting up his own company, denoted by
U . Since the payoﬀ from leaving increases in x (independently of whether the firm sues or
not) the worker leaves if x exceeds some (unique) treshold value. We denote this threshold
for z, i.e., z = {x : U = B}.
Case A. The firm litigates. The worker gets B if he stays in the firm, while the
expected payoﬀ from leaving equals (1− φ)x. Hence z = B/(1− φ). For given B and e,
the worker’s expected utility equals,
U =
z−eZ
−∞
Bg(²)d²+ (1− φ)
∞Z
z−e
(e+ ²)g(²)d²− c(e). (1)
The first integral is the worker’s expected utility when staying (x < z) and the latter inte-
gral is the worker’s utility if he leaves (x > z). Let us analyze the worker’s eﬀort decision.
Suppose that the worker believes that the firm will oﬀer B at date 3 (in equilibrium his
conjecture is fulfilled). The marginal utility from exerting eﬀort equals,
Ue = −Bg(z − e) + (1− φ)(e+ z − e)g(z − e) + (1− φ)
∞Z
z−e
g(²)d²− c0(e) (2)
= −[(1− φ)z −B]g(z − e) + (1− φ)[1−G(z − e)]− c0(e).
Since B = z(1− φ), the first term cancels and the optimal eﬀort choice, e∗, is implicitly
defined by,11
(1− φ) (1−G (z − e∗))− c0(e∗) = 0. (3)
The first term represents the marginal gain from eﬀort while the second term reflects the
marginal cost. Since 1 − G(.) equals the probability that the agent starts up his own
11Second order condition Uee = (1− φ) g(z)− c00(e∗) < 0.
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company, we see that the agent’s motivation to exert eﬀort stems from the possibility of
becoming an entrepreneur. All other equal, the worker will be more strongly motivated if
property rights are weak, or if he expects a subsequent low wage oﬀer to be made by the
firm. The first best level of eﬀort obtains for c0(e) = 1. A high φ or a low expected wage
both contribute to make the worker’s eﬀort ineﬃciently low.
Let us now turn to the firm’s choice of B. For given (e,B) the firm’s profit equals
Π =
Z z−e
−∞
(θ(e+ ²)−B)g(²)d²+
Z ∞
z−e
(φθ(e+ ²)− v)g(²)d²− F. (4)
The first integral is the firm’s profit from worker types that stay, and the second integral
is the firm’s profits from suing worker types that leave. Suppose that the firm believes
that the worker chooses eﬀort level equal to e (in equilibrium this conjecture is fulfilled).
Taking z as the firm’s choice variable, the marginal profit equals,
Πz = (θz −B)g(z − e)−
Z z−e
−∞
∂B
∂z
g(²)d²− (φθz − v)g(z − e) (5)
= (θz −B)g(z − e)− (1− φ)G(z − e)− (φθz − v)g(z − e)
= [z(θ − 1)(1− φ) + v]g(z − e)− (1− φ)G(z − e)
This equation reflects the firm’s trade-oﬀ when setting a wage oﬀer. An increased wage
means that the firm keeps more worker types (the first term), but must also pay more to all
types that stay (the second term). We see that a higher θ increases the gain from keeping
the marginal worker type. A higher φ decreases the gain from keeping the marginal worker
type (since the firm gets more from suing) and decreases the wage increase necessary to
keep the marginal worker type. The optimal z, denoted by z∗, is implicitly defined by
Πz = 0.
Case B. The firm does not litigate. If the firm does not litigate, the worker’s payoﬀ
from leaving equals x. Hence z = B. It follows from the same type of derivation as in
Case A that the optimal level of eﬀort solves,
1−G (z − e∗)− c0(e∗) = 0 (6)
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Just as in Case A, the agent’s incentive to exert eﬀort stems from the possibility of later
becoming an entrepreneur. Since the worker keeps a higher fraction of value upon leaving
than in Case A, the worker’s incentives to exert eﬀort are stronger (for given z) in Case
B than in Case A. The profit given not suing equals
Π =
Z z−e
−∞
(θ(e+ ²)−B)g(²)d²− F (7)
The firm’s marginal profits become,
Πz = (θz −B)g(z − e)−
Z z−e
−∞
∂B
∂z
g(²)d² (8)
= (θz −B)g(z − e)−G(z − e)
= z(θ − 1)g(z − e)−G(z − e)
As in Case A, an increased wage means that the firm keeps more worker types (the first
term), but must also pay more to all types that stay (the second term). A higher θ
increases the gain from keeping the marginal worker type, and φ has no eﬀect on the
optimal wage policy. The optimal z, denoted by z∗, is implicitly defined through setting
Πz = 0.
3.2 Suing policy
Having characterized the optimal leaving and eﬀort decision by the worker, and the opti-
mal wage oﬀer by the firm, let us now examine the firm’s choice of suing policy. We first
clarify the trade-oﬀ involved when designing a suing policy. The following result follows
from a direct comparison of the suing an no-suing subgames.
Lemma 1 Fix θ and φ. Eﬀort is lower if the firm sues than if the firm does not sue.
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 1 clarifies the firm’s trade-oﬀ the when deciding upon a suing policy. Suing
ensures that the firm gets a piece of the cake if the worker leaves, but also reduces the
size of the cake since eﬀort decreases. To understand this result, consider Figure 2 which
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illustrates the worker’s best eﬀort response function, e∗(z; .) and the employer’s best
response function z∗(e; .).
S 
NS
( )⋅;* ze  
( )⋅;* ez  
z  
e  
Figure 2: Eﬀects from the firm deciding to sue leaving workers.
e∗(z; .) slopes downward because a higher expected wage oﬀer means that the worker
becomes less motivated. z∗(e; .) slopes upward because a higher e means that it will be
more attractive to keep the marginal worker type. The unique equilibrium given no suing
is given by the intersection of the two dotted lines.
When the firm sues, the worker’s marginal gain from eﬀort (for a given conjecture
about z) is less than if the firm does not sue, since his share of the cake becomes smaller.
This reduction in the incentives to supply eﬀort is depicted by the vertical arrows in
Figure 2. The firm, on the other hand, will with suing have a higher marginal gain from
raising z than under no suing (for a given conjecture about e) since he now avoids the
suing costs. This increase in the incentives to pay the agent is depicted by the horizontal
arrows in Figure 2. Both eﬀects work in the direction of a lower eﬀort when moving from
a no-suing to a suing regime, as depicted by the move from NS to S in Figure 2. The
economic implication is that the firm faces a clear trade-oﬀ when choosing a suing policy:
suing gives weaker incentives for the worker to leave but also weaker incentives to exert
eﬀort.
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The net eﬀect on z from suing is ambiguous.12 From Figure 2 we see that if the worker’s
eﬀort only weakly responds to changes in the value of their outside option (e∗(z; .) is flat)
then the eﬀect on z∗(e; .) will dominate and, consequently, z decreases if the firm practices
a lenient suing policy towards leavers.
The firm’s suing decision. We now investigate how θ and φ aﬀect the suing decision.
Proposition 1 (i)A firm not protected by complementary assets (θ = 1) must sue its
leaving workers to get positive profits.(ii)A firm strongly protected by property rights (θ >>
1 and φ ≈ 1)) may not sue its leaving workers.
Proof. See Appendix.
If a firm not protected by complementary assets does not sue, adverse selection implies
negative profits. For any continuation wage level, the firm will only keep worker types
with ideas less valuable than the oﬀered wage. In contrast, a firm that is strongly pro-
tected through complementarity and intellectual property rights may increase its profit by
relinquish its intellectual property rights and not sue. The intuition is simple: a no-suing
policy improves the worker’s outside option and increases eﬀort. With complementarities,
the positive eﬀect on profits from increased eﬀort can be stronger than the negative eﬀect
on profits from not suing the leavers. Given this argument, our interpretation of HP’s
personnel policy is that it was well protected by property rights or by complementary
assets, so well that suing leaving workers would seriously impact worker initiative.
3.3 Complementary assets
Let us now evaluate how worker initiative and wages change if the firm holds more com-
plementary assets. The following result holds independently of the firm’s suing decision.
Proposition 2 If the firm holds more complementary assets, then
i) Wages are higher
12The eﬀect on wage setting is ambiguous as well. By suing leaving workers, the firm finds it easier to
keep workers by increasing the wage level slightly (the marginal eﬀect on z from an increase in wage B is
increased). On the other hand, the firm can reduce its wage oﬀer because it captures value from leaving
ideas. Therefore, depending on parameter values of the underlying distribution functions and cost of
eﬀort function, suing and wages can be complementary or substitute instruments for the firm when it
tries to keep its workers.
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ii) Eﬀort is lower, and
iii) Turnover is lower.
Proof. See Appendix.
Figure 3 illustrates how an increase in the amount of complementary assets changes
the equilibrium outcome.
0>Δθ  
( )⋅;* ez  
( )⋅;* ze  
z  
e  
Figure 3: Eﬀects of stronger complementarities.
When θ increases, e∗(z; .) is unaﬀected (since the entrepreneurial option is unchanged),
whereas z∗(e; .) shifts to the right. This is because for any level of eﬀort it will be more
beneficial to keep the marginal worker type. Consequently, when θ increases the firm
raises its wage oﬀer to keep more worker types. When the wage is raised, the outside
option becomes less attractive and worker eﬀort decreases.
We may link θ to firm characteristics such as size.13 If we assume that large firms
have stronger economies of scope than small firms, Proposition 2 suggests that workers
in small firms put in higher eﬀort and create more start-up activities than workers in
large firms.14 The reason is that larger firms have more complementary assets, and pay
13One can also relate θ to industry maturity. Initially, firms are small, wages are low and the start-up
activities are plentiful. As the industry matures, concentration increases and there are more complemen-
tary assets inside the firm, workers get better wage oﬀers inside the firm but are less motivated, and fewer
workers leave to start up their own businesses. This provides a simple argument for why entry rates are
lower in mature industries. We are not aware of direct evidence relating to this question but note that
Long & Link (1983) find that firms in more concentrated markets have lower turnover.
14Economies of scope is the purported motive behind many mergers and acquisitions. Such a motive
would generate a positive link between firm size and economies of scope. The extent to which mergers do
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higher wages to reduce turnover. Our arguments therefore squares well with the empirical
regularities that larger firms have lower turnover (Oi, 1983, Evan & MacPherson, 1996)
and pay higher wages (Fox, 2004).15
One environment that may serve as a testbed of the theory is firms in the aftermath of
M&As. M&As, particularly in the technology sector, are often motivated by economies of
scope. Our predictions would be that after such mergers, wages per worker should increase
and turnover due to workers pursuing start-up opportunities should drop. Conyon et al.
(2004) finds that wages do tend to increase following mergers.16
3.4 Property rights protection
In this section we study the eﬀects of changes in property rights protection, interpreted
as the probability of the firm winning in court.
Proposition 3 Stronger intellectual property rights (increased φ)
i) Decrease eﬀort
ii) Has an ambiguous eﬀect on wages and turnover
Proof. See Appendix .
The eﬀects from strengthened intellectual property rights are illustrated in Figure 4.
in fact create economies of scope (rather than say market power) is the topic of a large literature, whose
findings are not conclusive. For a recent contribution to this literature, see Gomes & Livdan (2004).
15Henderson & Cockburn (1996) find a positive relation between economies of scope and R&D success
measured by ”significant” patents for a sample of biotech companies. This suggest that the direct positive
eﬀect on productivity from an increased θ dominates a possible negative eﬀect on productivity from
reduced eﬀort in their context.
16Brown & Medoﬀ (1987) reports a similar finding. Interestingly, Conyon et al. (2004) finds that the
increased wage eﬀect is larger for mergers by firms that are in the same industry. Such mergers are
arguably where one would expect the complementarity gain to be larger.
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Figure 4: Eﬀects from strengthened intellectual property protection.
When φ increases, the worker gets weaker incentives to exert eﬀort because the entrepre-
neurial payoﬀ is smaller. Hence e∗(z, .) shifts downwards. An increased φmakes it cheaper
for the firm to keep the marginal worker, because the entrepreneurial option has become
less attractive, and z∗(e; .) shifts to the right.17 Both these two eﬀects pull unambiguously
in the direction of a lower worker eﬀort.
Legal scholars argue that the Massachusetts courts are more ”pro-firm” while the
Californian courts are ”pro-employee” (Hellmann, 2002). Proposition 3, part (i), then has
resonance in Saxenian (1994), which argues that firms along Route 128 in Massachusetts
have fared less well than their counterparts in Silicon Valley.18
On welfare, we argue based on Proposition 3 that the eﬃcient intellectual property
rights from society’s viewpoint should balance the beneficial ex-ante eﬀects from motivat-
ing workers against the negative ex-post eﬀects on the use of complementary assets.19 We
17There is also the counter-acting eﬀect of workers leaving becoming less costly when φ increases, since
more is retained in court. This eﬀect is dominated in optimum.
18Variation in strength of property rights protection can be related to other variables than geography,
such as industry (OECD, 1998, Cohen et al., 2000) or with time. For example, up to the 1980-ies, software
innovations were diﬃcult to patent in the U.S. unless embedded in hardware (like mainframe computers
or pizza ovens). Landmark court decisions in the mid 90-ies dramatically improved the scope of patenting
software (Cohen & Lemley, 2001). Such variation in property rights protection across industries or time
may be explored in light of part (i) of Proposition 3.
19It is worthwile to note that φ = 1 can never be socially optimal. The intuition is that the marginal
gain in eﬀort from decreasing φ is large while the marginal turnover cost is small. As an aside, our
analysis suggests that neither firms nor workers would prefer courts to always rule in favor of the firm.
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note that existing policy literature (see Schotchmer, 2004) typically argues that intellec-
tual property rights should be strong when ex-ante eﬀects (on firms’ R&D investments)
are important relative to ex-post eﬀects (on the use of innovations). In contrast, our
analysis suggests that intellectual property rights should be weak when the ex-ante eﬀects
(on worker initiative) is relatively important and strong when the ex-post eﬀects (on the
use of complementary assets) are important.
3.5 Extensions
Let us here discuss some extensions of the framework.
Out-of court settlement: Many intellectual property conflicts are settled before
they reach the court. In our context it is most natural to think of such pretrial-negotiations
as a situation where the firm oﬀers the worker to pay a licensing fee as a compensation
for using the idea. Suppose that the firm oﬀers the worker to pay a fixed licensing fee
L.20 If L is accepted by the worker, the parties save litigation costs and the firm must
refrain from suing the worker. If the oﬀer is rejected, the worker and firm meet in court
as discussed before. In choosing L, the firm balances the gain from increased licensing fee
from accepting worker types and the loss due to lower acceptance rate and consequent
litigation costs. Our analysis suggests that the equilibrium outcome splits the value of
ideas into three intervals. The first interval consists of workers with the poorest ideas.
These workers accept the continuation wage oﬀered and stay inside the firm. The second
interval consists of workers with better ideas. These workers leave the firm and are
litigated by the firm since they do not accept the suggested licensing agreement (out-
of-court settlement). The third interval consists of workers with the best ideas. These
workers accept the licensing contract. In an empirical paper, Lerner (2004) studies all
litigation cases for a sample of firms fromMiddlesex, Massachusetts (the borough in which
the hi-tech area Route 128 is located). Amongst others, Lerner finds that larger firms are
more involved with litigation cases involving intellectual property rights than small firms.
Our analysis of pretrial negotiations suggest that the cases collected by Lerner (2004) are
20A variable licensing fee depending on sales or profit of the new firm may be more diﬃcult to implement
due to problems of verifiability. The eﬀect of a varying licensing fee on worker initiative and turnover
can be done in much the same manner as with φ.
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intermediate in terms of value, and may therefore be the ”tip of the iceberg”.
The wage oﬀer: We have assumed that the firm does not receive information about
the value of the idea before giving a wage oﬀer. There are various ways to make the firm’s
decision more informed. The most straightforward approach is to let the firm receive a
signal about the value of the idea before deciding upon a wage oﬀer. In a previous version
of the paper, we showed that if a signal S is generated by the process s = x + δ, where
δ is normally distributed, then there exists an easily characterizable equilibrium where
the wage oﬀer is increasing in the signal. The signal creates additional incentives to exert
eﬀort because the (expected) wage oﬀer increases in the level of eﬀort.
Rather than having the uninformed firmmaking a wage oﬀer, we could let the informed
worker demand a continuation wage. This modeling approach opens up for signaling
equilibria where a higher demand from the worker is associated with an idea of better
quality (see Hvide, 2005, for a related analysis). We do not believe that such modified
wage bargaining will have important eﬀects on the results we focus on.
Finally, by requiring the wage oﬀer to be sequentially rational, we have implicitly
assumed that the firm cannot commit to a wage policy before it hires the worker. The
main diﬀerence between the commitment and non-commitment cases is that in the former,
the principal takes into account the negative eﬀect on eﬀort from increasing the wage. The
optimal wage will be lower in the commitment case, and as a consequence turnover will
be higher. Apart from this, our analysis of the commitment case has yielded qualitatively
the same results as in the present analysis.
Investments in complementary assets: The analysis takes the level of comple-
mentary assets as being determined by industry characteristics or size of the firm. We
can also think of complementary assets as being endogenously determined by firm invest-
ments. More complementary assets gives a negative eﬀect on eﬀort since, by Proposition
2, worker eﬀort decreases because more complementary assets makes the worker anticipate
a higher wage oﬀer. This, in turn, implies that the worker becomes less motivated. When
making an investment decision, the firm therefore trades-oﬀ the positive eﬀect on asset
deployment with decreased worker initiative. The profit-maximizing level of investments
will therefore depend upon the elasticity of eﬀort with respect to increased investments: a
firm’s profit-maximizing level of R&D investment decreases as a worker’s eﬀort becomes
18
more elastically supplied.
4 Conclusion
We have developed a simple theoretical framework to study how complementarities and
intellectual property rights aﬀect the management of knowledge workers. We report three
sets of findings. First, firms strongly protected by property rights may not sue leaving
workers in order to motivate eﬀort, while firms weakly protected by complementary assets
must sue in order to obtain positive profits. Second, firms with more complementary assets
pay higher wages and have lower turnover, but such higher pay has a detrimental eﬀect
on worker initiative. Third, we suggests that the socially optimal intellectual property
rights protection strikes the balance between the eﬃcient use of complementary assets
and worker initiative.
We see three areas of application for our work. First, our findings on optimal suing
policy might be useful to firms deliberating which attitude to take vis-a-vis leaving work-
ers. Our analysis suggests a clear trade-oﬀ: more suing gives the firm a larger piece of the
pie if a worker leaves, but also gives less worker initiative and hence a smaller pie. Second,
our results that stronger complementarities imply higher wages, less turnover, and less
worker initiative gives a set of hypotheses to test for in personnel data on R&D inten-
sive firms. These predictions are not obvious; for example the eﬃciency wage theory of
Shapiro & Stiglitz (1986) predict that higher wages should lead to workers exerting more
eﬀort (because of increased cost to the worker of being fired). Third, our results on the
eﬀects of property rights legislation may be of interest to policy makers that aim to better
understand the eﬀects of changes in intellectual property rights legislation. One case that
comes to mind is the current discussion in Europe on the appropriate patent protection
for software innovations: we suggest that strengthened protection may reduce turnover
costs but may also decrease the productivity of knowledge-work due to less motivated
workers.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1 (eﬀort and the suing decision): Let us first examine the no suing
case (Case B). Equilibrium is then given by (z, e) which simultaneously solves (6) and
(8). Consider the ”best-response” functions e∗(z; .) and z∗(e; .) that are implicitly defined
by (6) and (8). Shorten the notation by writing just g and G instead of g(z − e) and
G(z − e). By the implicit function theorem we have that ∂e
∗
∂z
= −Uez
Uee
and
∂z∗
∂e
= −ΠzeΠzz
.
Since Uee < 0 by the agent’s second order condition and, as can easily be shown, Uez =
− g
Uee
> 0, we must have
∂e∗
∂z
< 0. Since Πzz < 0 by the firm’s second order condition
and Πze = −Πzz +(θ− 1)g, we must have that Πze > 0 and therefore
∂z∗
∂e
> 0. Note that
since
∂e∗
∂z
< 0 and
∂z∗
∂e
> 0 then for any for any (φ, θ).there is a unique equilibrium in
(z, e).
To evaluate the eﬀect on equilibrium values of (z, e) from the firm changing its suing
policy, we evaluate the eﬀects on e∗(z; .) and z∗(e; .) in turn. From equation (6), the
agent’s marginal gain from exerting eﬀort under the no suing regime equals 1−G (z − e).
From equation (3), the agent’s marginal gain from exerting eﬀort under the suing regime
equals (1−φ) (1−G (z − e)). Since (1−φ) < 1, the agent’s marginal incentives (for given
z) is stronger under no suing, and e∗ is higher under no suing than under suing. Hence
when the firm changes its suing policy from no suing to suing, the e∗(z; .) function shifts
to the south in the (z, e) space in Figure 2.
Now consider the eﬀect on z∗(e; .) from changing the firm’s suing policy. Denote Πz
under no suing, given by equation (8), by Πnz , and denote Πz under suing, given by
equation (5), by Πsz. Combining (5) and (8) then gives,
Πsz = (1− φ)Πnz + vg (9)
Now denote the optimal z under no suing for z∗n and the optimal z under suing for z
∗
s . By
definition, Πnz (z∗n) = 0. Since (1− φ) < 1 and vg > 0 it follows from the global concavity
of Πnz that z∗s > z∗n. Hence when the firm changes its suing policy from no suing to suing,
z∗(e; .) shifts to the east in Figure 2.
To summarize, we have shown that moving from the no suing to the suing regime has
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two eﬀects. First, e∗(z; .) shifts to the south in Figure 2, while z∗(e; .) shifts to the east.
The equilibrium level of eﬀort must decrease when the firm moves from a no suing to a
suing regime.
Proof of Proposition 1: (i)We show that if the firm does not sue and θ = 1, the
firm’s profits are negative. First note that if the firm does not sue, then z = B. For θ = 1,
the firm’s profits therefore equal
R B−e
−∞ (x−B)g(²)d², where x = e+ ². This expression is
negative because x < B for any ² ∈ (−∞, B−e]. By continuity, the firm’s profits are also
negative for θ close to 1. (ii) Suppose that φ = 1. If the firm sues, the worker gets nothing
if he leaves. Therefore, all worker types stay for any B ≥ 0. We can therefore set z =∞,
and the firm’s profits equal
R∞
−∞(x−B)g(²)d². Since the worker’s eﬀort equals zero from
equation (3),
R∞
−∞ xg(²)d² =
R∞
−∞ ²g(²)d². The latter expression is zero since ² is white
noise. But since B ≥ 0, the firms profits
R∞
−∞(x − B)g(²)d² must be non-positive. We
now construct an example where not suing leads to positive profits. Let g(²) be uniformly
distributed on [−1
2
, 1
2
] and let c(e) = γ
2
e2. If the firm does not sue, z = B the profits are
Π =
R B−e
−1
2
(θ (e+ ²)−B)g(²)d². For a given B, the worker chooses eﬀort to maximize
U =
Z z−e
− 1
2
Bg(²)d²+
Z 1
2
z−e
(²+ e) g(²)d²− c(e) (10)
=
Z B−e
− 1
2
Bg(²)d²+
Z 1
2
B−e
(²+ e) g(²)d²− γ
2
e2
= B (B − e)− 1
8
(2B − 2e− 1) (2B + 2e+ 1)− γ
2
e2
Diﬀerentiating with respect to e and solving, we have the unique interior solution e∗ (z) =
(1
2
− z)/γ, with second order condition γ > 1. Substituting into the profit function, we
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get
Π =
Z B−e
− 1
2
(θ (e+ ²)−B)g(²)d² (11)
=
Z z−( 1
2
−z)/γ
− 1
2
(θ((
1
2
− z)/γ + ²)− z)g(²)d²
=
∙
²θ(
1
2
− z)/γ + 1
2
θ²2 − z²
¸z−( 1
2
−z)/γ
− 1
2
=
1
8γ2
(θ − 2zθ − 4zγ − θγ + 2zθγ) (2z + γ + 2zγ − 1)
Diﬀerentiating with respect to z and solving, we obtain the first order condition
1
2γ2
¡
θ + γ − 2zθ − 4zγ − θγ − γ2 − 4zγ2 + 2zθγ2
¢
= 0 (12)
which implies the unique interior solution z∗ =
(θ + γ) (γ − 1)
2 (θγ − 2γ − θ) (γ + 1) , with second order
condition 1γ2 (θγ − 2γ − θ) (γ + 1) < 0. Substituting in for z∗ into the profit function,
Π = 1
8γ2
(θ − 2z∗θ − 4z∗γ − θγ + 2z∗θγ) (2z∗ + γ + 2z∗γ − 1) (13)
= − (γ − 1)
2 (θ − 1)2
8 (θγ − 2γ − θ) (γ + 1) .
Since the denominator is negative by the second order condition, the firm’s profits are
always positive.
Proof of Proposition 2 and Proposition 3: We are interested in the eﬀect of a
change in θ or φ on the equilibrium e, z, T in the case where the firm sues (Case A) and
in the case where the firm does not sue (Case B). We label the turnover rate as T , where
T = 1−G(z− e). Let us consider Case A, when the firm sues. On reduced form, we can
suppress B and write the two first order conditions (3) and (5) as,
Πz(z, e,φ, θ) = 0 (14)
Ue(e, z,φ) = 0
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Denote partials by subscript and totally diﬀerentiate (14),
Πzzdz +Πzede+Πzφdφ+Πzθdθ = 0 (15)
Ueede+ Uezdz + Ueφdφ = 0
We want to examine the eﬀect of changing θ and φ, respectively. Solving the system
yields.
dz
dφ
=
ΠzφUee −ΠzeUeφ
ΠzeUez −ΠzzUee
,
de
dφ
=
ΠzzUeφ − UezΠzφ
ΠzeUez −ΠzzUee
(16)
dz
dθ
=
ΠzθUee
ΠzeUez −ΠzzUee
,
de
dθ
=
−UezΠzθ
ΠzeUez −ΠzzUee
Let us now evaluate the partials. Diﬀerentiating Ue from equation (3),
Ueφ = −(1−G(z − e)) < 0 (17)
Uee = (1− φ)g(z − e)− c00(e) < 0
Uez = −(1− φ)g(z − e) < 0
Note that Uee = −Uez − c00. Now the firm. Diﬀerentiating Πz from equation (5),
Πzφ = −z(θ − 1)g +G(z − e) > 0 (18)
Πzz = (θ − 1)(1− φ)g(z − e) + (v + z(θ − 1)(1− φ))g0(z − e)− (1− φ)g(z − e) < 0
Πze = −Πzz + (θ − 1)(1− φ)g(z − e) > 0
Πzθ = (1− φ)zg(z − e) < 0
Now return to (16). The denominator equals ΠzeUez−ΠzzUee. This expression is negative
given the signs of the partials in (17) and (18). Both terms in the numerator of
de
dφ
are
positive and hence
de
dφ
< 0. Both terms in the numerator of
de
dθ
are negative and hence
de
dθ
> 0. Neither
dz
dφ
nor
dz
dθ
can be signed unambiguously since the terms in the numerator
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are of diﬀerent sign. Now consider turnover. Recall that T = (1−G(z − e)). Therefore
dT
di
= g(z − e)(de
di
− dz
di
), where i = θ,φ (19)
Denote the denominator of (16) byD < 0. Substitute (16) into (19) using Uee = −Uez−c00,
dT
dθ
= (−UezΠzθ −ΠzθUee)/D
= −Πzθ(Uee + Uez)/D = c00Πzθ/D < 0
dT
dφ
= (ΠzzUeφ − UezΠzφ −ΠzφUee +ΠzeUeφ)/D
= [ΠzzUeφ − (−Uee − c00)Πzφ −ΠzφUee + (−Πzz + k)Ueφ]/D
= (kUeφ + c
00Πzφ)/D
where k = (θ − 1)(1− φ)g(z − e). Hence we have established that dT
dθ
< 0.
Let us now consider case B, when the firm does not sue. In that case the partials are
Ueφ = 0 (20)
Uee = θg(z − e)− c00(e) < 0
Uez = −θg(z − e) < 0
Π =
Z z−e
−∞
(θ(e+ ²)−B)g(²)d²− F (21)
The marginal profits are
Πz = zθg(z − e)−G(z − e) (22)
and the partials are,
Πzφ = 0 (23)
Πzz = θg(z − e) + zθg0(z − e)− g(z − e) < 0 Firm’s SOC
Πze = −Π0z + θg(z − e) > 0
Πzθ = zg(z − e) > 0
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which gives,
dz
dφ
= 0,
de
dφ
= 0 (24)
dz
dθ
=
ΠzθUee
ΠzeUez −ΠzzUee
≷ 0, de
dθ
=
−UezΠzθ
ΠzeUez −ΠzzUee
< 0
A changed φ has no eﬀect on turnover. The eﬀect on turnover of increased θ is negative
as when the firm sues.
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